The US Global Guide was never just swimming

Your guide to what the US 2024 elections are for Washington and the world

Last week, a frantic search for a historical orientation was held at the Oval Office at the Oval Office.

It was clearly more shocking than everything that happened during Donald Trump’s first term. But or, in its consequences, worse than pushing for a global war with terrorism under George Bush? Worse than Richard Nixon’s violation Breton Woods? Are the blatant bombing of America Cambodia and Laos? More outrageous than many coups with the Cold War or the tough talks that have taken place, however, behind closed doors during World War II?

We had a little over 100 years of globalism, and it was not simple swimming. The first blow on the road was catastrophic. In 1919, the Republican Congress refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and with it the plan of President Wood Wilson on the League of Nations. Prior to the “red fear”, racing riots, trial on monkeys and revival -key -key, US diplomacy departed from the world.

In the 1930s, the British and French governments of the right and left faced the threat of Mussolini, Hitler and Imperial Japan. They hoped for democratic procedures, long-term social equilibrium, reasonable budget, managed currencies and new Maginot line technologies and radars. Meanwhile, the coincidence was motivated by the hope that it would stimulate reasonable conservatives in Berlin, Rome and Tokyo to restrain people violence. Was the US ready to help? It wasn’t. The best that Congress suggested is cash and transfer. Hitler’s European detention strategy failed in despair, which followed by the United States, sharing a destroyer party in the elderly. America’s interest in Greenland goes back to this period.

The moment of the US government, which determines what we mean today under global hegemony, was actually very short – it lasted from 1941 to the beginning of the 1960s. This was supported by the enlightened technical and external American business community. In Washington, he relied on the liberalism of the new deal and the control of the Democratic Party over the racist Jim Kraou South. What underwent it was the completion of the US Democracy with the 1964 civil rights law. It alienated south of the progressive Democrats and sent a white vote that slides towards the Republicans.

Trump is a legitimate heir of a reactionary, national populist, who is in deep democracy in the US. However, it is also clear that it is the most brutal, independent, disobedient active, which has ever decorated the White House. What went wrong?

It is important that the elite checks and the remains failed in the Republican Party. And without a strong left movement, the result of elite weakness in the US is that democracy slides towards muddy populism. A considerable part of the US electorate will vote for anyone, except for a member of the liberal elite. The smaller, but still significant, the segment positively loves Trump. Added dynamism proceeds from the fact that, unlike its first term, Trump opens the door to the new guard of young men presented by the Vice President of J. D. Vens and Elon Musk.

Anyone who tracked the radicalization of GOP since the 1990s remembers Newt Gingrich and Sarah Palin and felt that a gentle admiration for a compassionate merit in America could see that it was a crash.

For some time it was clear that the United States needed a new and much more restrained formula for foreign policy. Bernie Sanders, in the phraseologism of the Old USA, called for stopping American imperialism. Barack Obama advocated restraint, though Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, preferred a wider line.

Joe Biden deeply oversee the late revival of US claims to global leadership. As a result, the administration that made the United States in defense of Ukraine supported the Israeli escalation in the Middle East and participated in the Brinkman with China. This was satisfied with Washington “Blob”, revived the Atlantist spirits and fed self -resorting in Europe. But despite the fact that the claim of Biden’s administration pursues foreign policy for the US middle -class, popular support for its approach was fragile.

Of course, Trump is vandal. But in the destruction of the status – it is nothing more than confirming the obvious – that the elite coalition that contributed to us the global leadership lost its political seizure. If Europe wants something like to call a “order based on the rules”, it will have to do it for itself.

At least in the compass of its own relationship with the rest of the world, Europe has funds for this, and political culture, is quite reliable for its maintenance. In Berlin this week, we finally heard the proper answer when the chancellor, waiting for Friedrich Merz, agreed to a coalition program that would see a mass increase in defense costs. This is not a deal, and it will not save Ukraine from a terrible choice. But this offers the perspective that Europe can finally go beyond its humiliating fear of Russia and dependence on another unreliable America.