Putin may be able to get what he wants in Ukraine Russia-Ukrainian war

After a long telephone call between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump, who followed the fifth Ukrainian conversations in Jedda, seems to war in Ukraine enters his final phases.

It seems that Moscow and Kiev agreed with Trump’s search for a peace settlement, although the details of their positions related to specifics continue to cuddle.

Kyiv agreed to Washington’s proposal for a 30-day unconditional recirccilement, followed by peace negotiations. The freezing of the conflict before the beginning of peace talks was not what Ukraine wanted, but the chances of losing more territories, infrastructure, human life and – very likely – American support, brought into the ship.

Russia, on his part, agreed to suspend rocket attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure for 30 days, while continuing debates for full review. Earlier, Moscow expressed concern not only on the logistics of the truce and guarantee to prevent violations, but also on what comes after that.

Caution is due to the fact that Russia has an advantage in the battlefield, which is not so eager to lose before the settlement frame is placed in stone. In any case, Russian officials sounded very options on the settlement prospects after Trump-Putin.

If negotiations on breaking fire, the question is asked whether Putin probably got everything he wanted in February 2022. When he launched a brutally all-out invasion of Ukraine.

The rough frame of the realistic achievement peace settlement has so far been clear for all parties. Moscow stated several times that the peacekeeping job is to follow the outline of the Istanbul agreement developed by Russian and Ukrainian delegations in the spring 2022. years, but in the end Ukraine under British and American pressure.

These agreements predicted military neutrality of Ukraine, cap for the size of its army and measures to protect Russian speakers living in Ukraine.

After three years of war, Moscow now wants Kyiv to recognize the loss of four Ukrainian regions – Donkey, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhi – for which Russia has formally declared their territory, although not yet fully occupied one of them. It is possible, however, that the Kremlin will cut off its maximum demand of Ukraine withdrawal from the unoccupied parts of these regions.

US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signaled that territorial talks would include the fate of the Zaporizhzhzhzhia nuclear power plant, which currently occupies Russia and is quite close to the front line. If Russia becomes a part of that conversation, it will mean that it no longer claims that it is unoccupied north of Zaporizhi and – expanding – unoccupied territory other three regions.

Discussions on nuclear power plants are a good sign because they indicate the transition of realistic concessions, the West and Ukraine can extract from Russia, in contrast to the field in the field in the guilt of “peacekeeping forces and French are pushed.

The key to understanding Putin’s logic accepts not to fight for the territory. He sees all-out invasion, which has now resulted in the occupation of the fifth of Ukrainian territory, as penalties for Ukraine, which encourages the agreements from Minsk 2015-2016, which predicted two separate regions, Donetsk and Luhansk, remaining under formal Ukrainian control. The Russian annexation of these two regions, together with Kherson and Zaporizhija, was a penalty for Ukraine that walks from the Istanbul agreement.

While the nuclear power plant could be feasible for another territory or more likely to the rights of Russian speakers and Moscow related Ukrainian Orthodox Churches, what is for Putin, support any security infrastructure or impact on Ukrainian security bodies.

Rooted in the west decision In the 1990s to comply, not integrate newly built democratic Russia, this conflict is really in the drawing of the thick red line out of which it does not go at the time when the discussion on the integration of Russia becomes possible.

For now, Putin will insist not only on the neutrality of Ukraine, but also to the removal of what he describes as “NATO infrastructure”, which includes military training and logistics content as well as CIA listening stations with the Russian border.

It will also probably demand that the undertaking security structure is prohibited strongly with CIA and MI6, such as the main intelligence directorate (HUR) and some administration of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU).

It is crucial, crucial, will insist on Kyiv and NATO on the 2008 Bucharest belt, in Bucharest, promises that Ukraine would become a member of the Alliance. That commitment, imposed in European Federal Allies of the US President George W Bush, launched tectonic changes in Russian foreign policy, which led to the Georgia and after that Ukraine.

Judging by signals removed from the Trump Administration, all these goals are achieved together with the filing of the sanctions against Russia – at least the USelf. The Kremlin has signaled that he could agree from $ 300 billion in frozen Russian property in the west could be used for postwar renewal in Ukraine. He sees that money as already lost and maybe he believes that a benevolent gesture could help to start fixing relationships with now a very hostile neighbor.

If it can all that, Putin will see his decision to become a war criminal by launching brutal aggression to the nearest neighbor in social, ethnic, cultural and economic, justified.

In addition to the insurance of Neutranity of Ukraine and pushing NATO away from Russian borders, Putin seems to be fulfilled another goal: Refining Russian superpowers in the eyes of the whole world.

For Western leaders, a failure to revelate in Russia will lead to late realization: that the main nuclear power, capable of destroying humanity, cannot be won. They can then consider the fact that Moscow could be very effectively influenced by the soft power – something that the West had much greater success during the Cold War.

Russia will remain culturally and economically dependent on Europe as it has always been. It will continue to be considered part of the European Community regardless of the fact that the community thinks about Russia. This creates more strategic opportunities for the West to reduce threats that are removed from Moscow than dealing in which Western officials now call “Proxy War” in Ukraine.

Attitudes expressed in this article are wet authority and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeere editor.