The Israeli army recognizes failures 7. October. His attack probe could put pressure on Netanyah

Tel Aviv, Israel – The investigation of the Israeli army determined that Hamas could spend the deadliest attack in Israeli history 7. October 2023. year, because it was a much powerful Israeli army to mistake at the intention of militant groups and undervaluated his abilities.

Findings, published on Thursday, were able to press Premiere Benjamin Netanyah to launch a wide-sought wider investigation in order to examine a political decision that preceded the attack, which preceded the attack War in Gaza.

Many Israeli believe that mistakes 7. October extended outside the army, and the wrong Netanyahu for what they consider a failed deterrent and retention strategy for years to attack. That strategy included enabling Qatar to send Cash suitcases In Gaza and the Side Hamas Rival, the International Proven Palestinian Administration.

The Prime Minister did not take responsibility, saying that he would answer difficult questions only after the war, which was paused for almost six weeks. Despite the pressure of the publicIncluding the families of approximately 1,200 people killed in the attack on 7. October, and 251 were taken as hostages in Gaza, Netanyahu resisted calls for investigations.

The main findings of the army were that the most powerful and more sophisticated military was inhabited in Hamas, underestimated its possibilities, is fully unwilling for surprises thousands of very armed militants in the early morning of the Main Jewish holiday.

In the comments on Monday, on Thursday, and shared with the media on Thursday, the head of the army, General Herzi Halevi, said he had taken responsibility for the army failure.

“I was the commander of the army 7. October, and I have my own responsibility. I also carry the weight of all your responsibilities – that’s what I see,” Halevi said, which he announced the resignation in January and was ordered to step next week.

The findings are military In accordance with past conclusions reached officials and analysts. The military announced only the summary of the reports and military officials, they presented his findings.

“Oct. 7 was a complete failure,” said one military official, who spoke about the state of anonymity in accordance with the regulations.

The central misconception was that Hamas, which seized control over the worse from the Palestinian bodies in 2007. years, more interested in managing the territory from the fight against Israel, found tests.

The military also misjudged the possibilities of the militant group. Military planners imagined that, in the worst, Hamas could post a ground floor invasion with up to eight border points, the official said. In fact, Hamas had more than 60 attack routes.

Intelligence assessed after the attack attack has shown that Hamas approached near ropes in three work occasions, but postponed for unknown reasons, the official said.

The official said that in hours before the attack were the signs that something was fine, including when Hamas Fighters transferred telephones to the Israeli network.

Perception that Hamas did not want to make the decision-making decisions away from taking action that night that could prevent the attack. Israeli military official said intelligence shows that Yahya SinwarMastermind attack 7. October who was killed last October began to plan him already in 2017. years.

With military guard on holiday weekend, Hamas launched a heavy wave of rockets that allowed thousands of fighters to shoot through a security fence or fly to the views of the sliders. They demolished supervisory cameras and quickly overwhelmed hundreds of soldiers stationed at the border.

From there they advanced to the key intersection of the highway and attacked troops shipped to the area, including some high officials, interfere with military command and control, towards another military official.

The first three hours after the attack, Hamas Fighters were Maroyals through the border communities IA Music festival with little resistance. That was when the majority of 251 hostages were taken and most people were killed, the official said. The official said Haos led to friendly fire incidents, although he said that there was not much, without discovering the figure.

It took hours for the army to regain control and given until the area was completely cleared of militants.

According to the first official, the report blamed the army to be excessively in his knowledge and show no doubts in his basic concepts and beliefs. The abstract said that the key lesson was that Israel could not allow the threat to develop on its border.

She wrote several recommendations, including the creation of special preparation units for such surprise and great events, as well as reform in the military intelligence department that would encourage “openness, skepticism, listening, learning.”

They did not place blame on any individual soldiers or officers, but likely to open the path to calculating in military and possible discharges.

Some high officers except halves have also resignedincluding the former head of the military intelligence service.